Real-time cross-layer design for large-scale flood detection and attack trace-back mechanism in IEEE 802.11 wireless mesh networks by Khan, S & Loo, KK
REAL-TIME CROSS-LAYER DESIGN
1. Introduction 
The main objective of DoS attacks 
is either to completely tie up certain 
resources or to bring down an entire 
network so that the legitimate users are 
not able to access service(s). Flooding, 
one of the most sophisticated types of 
DoS attack, is spreading faster and caus-
ing more damage. Flooding exploits the 
huge resource asymmetry between the 
internet and the victim.
Detection and prevention of such 
attacks and misuses is of prime impor-
tance and it is a complex task because 
these attacks can be conducted anywhere 
and at anytime with varying intensity, 
particularly in the wireless mesh network 
(WMN) environment. Intrusion detec-
tion systems can be used to detect such 
flooding attacks; however, they may have 
a high incidence of false alarms. Current 
rules-based and anomaly-based intru-
sion detection systems detect intrusions 
either by matching patterns of network 
and users activities with pre-defined 
rules or they define the normal profile of 
system usages and then look for devia-
tion.1 These approaches have their con-
sequences and drawbacks. The former is 
well suited for known intrusions but it 
cannot detect new intrusions. The latter 
relies on deviation from normal usage 
and sometimes fails to detect well known 
intrusions.
In recent years, some well known web-
sites, for example ebay.com and yahoo.
com, were down for some time following 
successful distributed flooding attacks. The 
ultimate objective of such attacks is to make 
services unavailable to legitimate users.
The research community has proposed 
some important security mechanisms to 
detect flooding attacks at the TCP/IP 
layer, as wire-line networks (such as local 
LANs) are only vulnerable to network 
and transport layer flooding attacks such 
as UDP flood, ICMP flood, and IGMP 
flood. However, an adversary can launch 
not only TCP/IP layer flooding attacks 
but also MAC layer flooding attacks, such 
as probe-request flood and de-authentica-
tion flood against IEEE 802.11 WMN. 
Multi-layer flooding attacks can be detect-
ed using a cross-layer approach.
This paper introduces a real-time 
cross-layer flood detection and attack 
trace-back mechanism, RCFDAT, for 
WMN, which is based on a feature 
set formed from selected cross-layer 
parameters of different layers. RCFDAT 
analyses the parametric values and, once 
it detects the ongoing flooding attack, 
checks the severity and intensity of that 
attack by observing resources utilisa-
tion. The calculated statistics show that 
RCFDAT has a remarkable detection 
rate with low false alarms.
The remaining part of this paper is 
organised as follows: Section 2 describes 
related work in detecting flooding and 
associated attacks. Section 3 gives over-
view of different flooding attacks and 
possible techniques in WMN. Section 
4 explains the working mechanism of 
RCFDAT. Section 5 shows simulations 
and results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Related work
Most hosts are prone to flooding attacks 
over the internet, and prevention mecha-
nisms have been proposed to reduce the 
damages.3,4 Firewalls are one solution and 
ingress/ egress traffic filtering mechanisms 
fall under this category.5,6,7 Another is 
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an on-off feedback control strategy that 
defends against distributed denial of serv-
ice attacks – based on backward propa-
gation.8 The impact of DoS attacks on 
multicast protocols has been analysed and 
the weaknesses of traditional gossip-based 
multicast protocols have been evaluated.9
Most research has focused on analys-
ing the network traffic pattern of flood-
ing attacks.10,11,12 A flood prevention 
mechanism has been proposed using 
route-based filtering which requires 
routing and topological information 
to mark the packet valid with respect 
to source and destination addresses.13 
Some research has been carried out to 
trace back the flooding attack path. 
This research has generally been based 
on IP trace back mechanisms, which are 
not efficient enough to detect spoofed 
flooding attacks.14,15,16,17 Wavelet 
methods have been proposed, which 
capture high bandwidth flows to check 
the wavelet variance resulting from 
attack traffic.2, 18
Another proposed flood detection 
method observes TCP control and data 
packets.19 The method is based on the 
assumption that during a SYN flooding 
attack, the number of SYN packets great-
ly increases compared to FIN packets. 
However, this mechanism is able to detect 
only SYN flooding. An improved ver-
sion extends the capability to detect other 
forms of flooding attacks by considering 
TCP flag rates and protocol rates.20 This 
mechanism is based on the philosophy 
that the number of TCP packets with 
specific flags drastically changes or the 
number of IP packets sharply increases 
when flooding attacks occur. However, 
these mechanisms are unable to detect 
low-rate TCP targeted DoS attacks, in 
which TCP/IP traffic does not sharply 
increase because attackers keep the inten-
sity low.21 Furthermore they cannot clas-
sify the flooding attacks as low-intensity 
flooding or severe flooding.
A more appropriate approach to 
detecting low-rate flooding attacks is to 
take into consideration the resource uti-
lisation of the system of incoming traf-
fic. However, rapid increase in resource 
utilisation may not be necessarily be due 
to flooding attacks. Sometimes software 
bugs, worms, and viruses like MS-Blast 
can also be the reason for a rapid 
increase in resource use.22
Most current approaches deal with 
flooding attacks against the TCP/IP of 
wired or wireless networks, such as UDP 
flood, SYN flood, IGMP flood, and 
ICMP flood. However, IEEE 802.11 
WMNs and IEEE 802.11 WLANs 
are vulnerable to MAC layer flooding 
attacks such as de-authentication and 
probe request flood.23,26 Cross-layer 
flood detection mechanism is necessary 
to detect the great variety of flooding 
attacks against the broadband services 
of IEEE 802.11 WMNs, and to defend 
against multi-layer flooding with great 
accuracy. Our mechanism takes param-
eters from the MAC layer and TCP/
IP to detect the flooding attacks. Once 
the flooding attack is detected, then 
RCFDAT classifies its severity as well as 
traces back the attack source(s).
RCFDAT has many advantages with 
respect to the existing methods:
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basis of severity such as medium, high 
or severe.
UÊ ÌÊ `iÌiVÌÃÊ }Ê v`}Ê >ÌÌ>VÃÊ Ì>ÌÊ
have a sharp increase in flows by mon-
itoring traffic flows, while it detects 
low-rate flooding attacks by constant-
ly watching resources utilisation.
UÊ ÌÊÌÀ>ViÃÊL>VÊÌiÊ>ÌÌ>V}ÊÃÕÀVi­Ã®°
3. Flooding attacks
In a single node flooding attack, a single 
host is used, while in distributed flood-
ing, multiple infected systems are used 
to carry out flooding to heavily congest 
the network. The attacker prevents the 
access of legitimate users to broadband 
services. In such attacks, the attackers 
are well protected, and they use a public 
network for flooding to bring about these 
disasters. IEEE 802.11 is more vulner-
able to such flooding attacks due to the 
large-scale community-based coverage 
– decentralised architecture in which the 
attacker can launch such attacks from 
anywhere anytime. Furthermore end users 
are connected with the Mesh Gateway 
(MG) through the multi-hop backbone 
of Access Points (APs) or Wireless Mesh 
Routers (WMRs). This kind of multi-hop 
decentralised architecture makes it easier 
for attackers to launch three types of net-
work layer flooding attacks.
Single node flooding against AP 
or WMR
In this type of attack, a single node starts 
flooding against the AP or WMR. The 
purpose of such an attack is to exhaust 
the computation as well as bandwidth 
resources. However, this type of attack is 
not so severe.
Distributed flooding against AP 
or WMR
Normally, an AP is capable of serving 
approximately 30 nodes. When many 
nodes that are in the direct communi-
cation range of an AP start flooding, 
this may seriously degrade the normal 
operations of AP in terms of bandwidth, 
CPU, memory, and other resources. This 
kind of attack is also capable of bringing 
down the target AP by denying broad-
band services to legitimate users.
Distributed flooding against MG
This is the most severe flooding attack 
against IEEE 802.11 WMN, in which 
multiple attack sources scattered around 
start flooding against the MG through 
the multi-hop backbone of APs. Such an 
attack may heavily congest the whole net-
work. Furthermore, if this kind of attack 
is more severe it may result in the crash of 
the MG. If this occurs the whole network 
will be down for all legitimate users.
Distributed flooding attacks can be 
launched by a highly skilled program-
mer and there is need for a high degree 
of interaction and collaboration amongst 
infected systems which are termed 
‘zombies’ and the attacker. Intermediate 
nodes are used for such collaboration as 
shown in figure 1. The attacker estab-
lishes a connection with the intermediate 
node and instructs to launch a distrib-
uted flooding attack. The intermediate 
node, after receiving the launching com-
10
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mand, sends a query to all zombies to 
check their status. Each zombie sends an 
acknowledgement to the intermediate 
node that it is ready for the attack. Once 
the intermediate node receives such an 
acknowledgement it instructs the zom-
bies to start flooding toward the target.24
The objectives of such attacks may be to 
overflow the bandwidth, memory, com-
putational, or connection buffer and may 
result in zero-service for all legitimate users. 
Zero-service is a situation in which legiti-
mate users are unable to access the network 
or network resources after a severe attack. 
The distributed flooding can be further 
classified on the basis of protocol used.
UDP Flood
In a UDP flooding attack, the attacker 
mostly uses techniques like TRINOO 
and Shaft.25 The communication between 
attacker and intermediate node is usu-
ally done by TCP, while UDP is used for 
communication between the intermediate 
node and the zombies. The zombies start 
flooding UDP packets towards the target 
once they receive the attack command 
from the intermediate node.
SYN Flood
In a SYN flooding attack, the attacker 
exploits the three-way handshake of the 
TCP mechanism. The attacker never 
completes the three-way handshake 
mechanism but requests the connection 
again and again using a spoofed IP and 
heavily overloads the target. The attacker 
mostly uses techniques like Tribe Flood 
Network (TFN) and TFN2K. The 
communication between the attacker 
and intermediate node is usually done 
by either command line interface or 
encrypted communication using a key-
based CAST-256 algorithm, while ICMP 
echo or UDP is used for communication 
between the intermediate node and the 
zombies.25 The zombies start flooding 
towards the target, and heavily overload 
its memory, computation, and band-
width resources. The attacker can also 
use TFN and TFN2K to launch UDP 
and ICMP flooding attacks.
ICMP Flood
ICMP flood, also known as Ping flood or 
Smurf attack, is a type of DoS attack that 
sends large amounts of oversized ICMP 
packets with the aim of crashing the TCP/
IP stack on the machine and causing it to 
stop responding to TCP/IP requests. The 
commonly used techniques to carry out 
this kind of flooding attack are TFN and 
stacheldraht. In stacheldraht, an encrypted 
TCP connection is used for communica-
tion between the attacker and intermediate 
nodes. ICMP echo is usually used by the 
intermediate node to instruct the zombies 
to launch the flooding attack.
Probe Request Flood
Probe request frames are used by cli-
ent nodes to discover a wireless network 
in IEEE 802.11 WMN and WLAN. 
If a wireless network exists then the AP 
responds with a probe response frame. The 
attacker can send a flood of probe request 
frames using MAC spoofing to represent 
a large number of nodes scanning for the 
wireless network, which heavily overloads 
and consumes the computation power and 
memory resources of the AP.
De-authentication Flood
Another flooding attack that may result 
in service unavailability to legitimate 
users is the de-authentication attack. The 
IEEE 802.11 client first authenticates 
with the AP before the start of com-
munication. After that, the client needs 
to send a de-authentication message to 
the AP to terminate the communication. 
This de-authentication message is itself 
not authenticated. The attacker may 
spoof a flood of such messages and the 
AP would then stop its communication 
with a large number of legitimate nodes 
until the authentication is re-established. 
The AP cannot refuse the de-authentica-
tion as it is a notification by the client to 
an AP to stop the communication.
4. Real-time cross-layer 
flood detection and 
attack trace-back  
mechanism (RCFDAT)
The motivation for the proposed mecha-
nism is based on the following facts:
UÊ ÕiÊ ÌÊ iÀiÌÊ ÛÕiÀ>LiÊ V>À>VÌiÀÃ-
tics, IEEE 802.11 WMN is more vulner-
able to flooding-type attacks as compared 
to wired or single-hop wireless networks.
UÊ /iÊÕµÕiÊÌÞ«iÊvÊ
Ê>ÞiÀÊv`-
ing such as probe-request flooding 
and de-authentication flooding may 
result in denial of service(s).
UÊ /iÊ>ÌÌ>ViÀÊ>ÃÊÌiÊviÝLÌÞÊÌÊÕÃiÊ
static as well as mobile zombies.
UÊ Ê V>ÃiÊ vÊ `ÃÌÀLÕÌi`Ê v`}]Ê vÊ ÌiÊ
attack intensity is greater than the total 
resources of MG, this may result in a 
complete collapse of broadband services.
UÊ vÊ >Ê v`}Ê >ÌÌ>VÊ `iÃÊ ÌÊ V-
pletely collapse the MG, however, the 
multi-hop backbone may still face 
serious congestion.
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Figure 1: Distributed flooding attack mechanism.
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MG, it is necessary to have a flood detec-
tion and alarm mechanism in APs or 
WMR in order to detect such attacks 
near the source(s). Such implementation 
not only protects the MG but also avoids 
congestion at the multi-hop backbone.
UÊ Ê VÀÃÃ>ÞiÀÊ v`Ê `iÌiVÌÊ iV-
anism would be a contender for 
detecting both network and MAC 
layer flooding attacks.
 
We aim to construct a large-scale multi-
layer flood detection approach with 
low computational complexity, high 
accuracy, and low false-alarm rate – we 
propose the RCFDAT.
We strongly believe that a flood 





the basis of protocol layers.
UÊ 
>ÃÃvV>ÌÊ vÊ ÃiÛiÀÌÞÊ vÊ v`}Ê
attacks such as low, medium or high 
intensity.
UÊ iÌiVÌÊ vÊ >ÌÌ>VÊ ÃÕÀViÃÊ ÕÃ}Ê
trace-back mechanism.
RCFDAT uses multiple data collec-
tion and a single data analysis (MCSA) 
in which multiple data collection 
modules gather the data. The received 
data is analysed by a single module 
as shown in figure 2. This technique 
is computationally less expensive 
compared to MCMA (Multiple data 
Collection, Multiple Analysis).27 
Selection of parameters from different 
layers is a critical task in cross-layer 
design.
Data collection
RCFDAT uses three separate modules 
for collecting data from MAC, network, 
and transport layers. MAC layer data is 
used to detect the MAC layer flooding 
attacks, while network as well as trans-
port layer data is used to detect UDP, 
SYN, ICMP, IGMP, and other such 
flooding attacks. The parameters over 
which the RCFDAT keeps watch are 
given in table 1.
Analysis module
For launching probe-request and de-
authentication flooding attacks, the adver-
sary uses the mechanism of MAC spoof-
ing. The MAC address is an important 
piece of information, but unfortunately 
it is not encrypted which may result in 
management frames exploitation. For 
example, an adversary (A) wants to spoof 
the MAC address of a legitimate user (L), 
so that its MAC address (MC(A)) matches 
with the legitimate user’s MAC address 
(MC(L)). By doing this, the adversary 
may gain full access to the network 
resources. The general format of MAC 
spoofing is shown as follows:
L  Legitimate user, AAdversary, 
therefore
MC(L) = MC(A)       (1)
The detection of probe-request and de-
authentication flooding attacks is required 
to counter the MAC spoofing. The 2-byte 
sequence control field of management 
frames can greatly facilitate in this regard, 
in which 4-bit are used for the fragment 
number while 12-bit are use for the 
sequence number.28 The adversary either 
needs to control the firmware functional-
ity or to develop a custom firmware with 
12
Network Security  May 2009
Figure 2: Block diagram of RCFDAT.
S # Parameters Protocol layer
 1 MAC address Link
 2 No. of probe requests and time interval between them Link
 3 No. of probe responses and time interval between them Link
 4 No. of de-authentication requests and time interval 
between them
Link
 5 No. of de-authentication responses and time interval 
between them
Link
 6 Sequence Control field Link
 7 TCP/IP protocol used (UDP, ICMP, IGMP) Transport, Network
 8 Packets send/received and duration Network
 9 Time To Live (TTL) Network
10 TCP flags ratio (SYN, FIN, ACK) Transport
11 Duration of the connection Transport
Table 1: Parameters.
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own source code to alter the value of the 
sequence control field in the management 
frames.29 Analysing the sequence control 
field along with the other parameters such 
as the number of probe requests, probe 
responses, de-authentication requests, de-
authentication responses, and their time 
intervals can identify such spoofed MAC 
layer flooding attacks. The constant time 
intervals suggest any of these flooding 
attacks.
Other flooding attacks such as UDP 
flood, SYN flood, and ICMP flood can 
be detected using parameters obtained 
from the network and transport layers. 
An important indication of flooding 
attack is a rapid increase in network 
traffic flow towards the target. Traffic 
analysis is very helpful in detecting an 
ongoing flooding attack or the possibil-
ity of such an attack.
The important requirement of packet 
analysis is to understand the underlying 
protocol that the packet is using. In traffic 
analysis the same mechanism is used as 
mentioned in ‘Compiling network traffic 
into rules using soft computing methods 
for the detection of flooding attacks with 
some modifications’.20 First the RCFDAT 
captures the network traffic and classifies 
it into TCP, UDP, ICMP, and IGMP by 
decoding the protocol field in its header. 
The numbers of packets sent/received are 
counted for a fixed duration. The port 
of the traffic is also watched in order to 
avoid port-level misbehaviour. In the case 
of the TCP, the header is checked, which 
contains SYN, FIN, and ACK flags. If 
any of the flags are turned on, the flag 
is counted. The source of the flooding 
attack can be detected using the source IP 
address. However, most of these attacks 
rely on spoofed IP addresses.
The TTL value can facilitate in detect-
ing whether the attack is from a single 
source or multiple sources. In the case 
of a single source, the TTL value would 
be the same, while a variation in the 
TTL value would suggest that there are 
multiple attackers. The attack trace-back 
mechanism is further strengthened by 
using the ant system (AS) algorithm. In 
the AS algorithm, ants interact in a dis-
tributed manner by sharing knowledge 
with their neighbours. The objective of 
every ant is an optimal solution towards 
the destination. The same mechanism 
is used in distributed flooding attacks – 
all zombies have the same destination. 
Combining the cross-layered parametric 
values such as management frames, TTL, 
sequence number, source, and destination 






ing mechanism or not.
 
To indentify a flooding attack from the 
n parametric flows, there is a flow-table 
which lists such flows having rapid 
increase and variations.
Let fe be the set of such flows in the 
flow-table and Pr( i) be the probability 
of choosing flow i with rapid increase, 
and ni be the intensity of flow i.
Let )(malipr be the probability of 
not choosing the innocent flow as the 
flooding. The node having flow under 
the normal threshold is not stored in 
the flow-table. Therefore,
Pr( i) = pr(ni >= ) = 1 – pr(ni =< )
Pr (ni =< ) = pr (ni   fe)
Pr (ni  fe) = pr (μi >=  )
Where μi is the flow i and  is the maxi-
mum level of flow reach its critical limit.
Let {nH} be the set of malicious flow, 
the probability of choosing a normal 
flow i is given below:
)Pr(mali  = 
nnHn 
Hence the probability of choosing an 
innocent flow is given by
Pr (m) = Pr ( i  )(mali )
Since the events are independent so
Pr (m) = pr ( i) * )(malipr
Severity check module
The role of this module is to check the 
intensity level of flooding attacks by clas-
sifying into medium, high and severe. 
Once a flooding attack is detected, 
the RCFDAT checks the status of the 
resources. One of the indications of 
an ongoing flooding attack is a rapid 
increase in the utilisation of available 
resources such as bandwidth and com-
putation. This module contains different 
profiles. The general format of the pro-
files is given in table 2.
Where Tru is the average value of utili-
sation, which can be calculated as
Tru = CPU Utilisation + Bandwidth 
consumption / 2
The severity check module also classifies 
the particular attack and its consequences 
on the overall system performance regard-
ing bandwidth and computation. The 
classification is given in table 3. 
UÊ /iÊ V«ÕÌi`Ê Û>ÕiÃÊ O1]Ê P]Ê
{UF, H}, and {UF, S} indicate that 
the UDP flooding attack is medi-
um, high and severe in intensity 
respectively.
ÊUÊ O-]ÊP]ÊO-]ÊP]Ê>`ÊO-]Ê-PÊ`V>ÌiÊÌ>ÌÊ
the SYN flooding attack is medium, high 
and severe in nature respectively.
UÊ O]ÊP]Ê O]ÊP]Ê >`Ê O]Ê -PÊ iÝ«ÀiÃÃÊ
the same statistics for an ICMP 
flooding attack.
UÊ /iÊÃ>iÊÌÞ«iÊvÊV>ÃÃvV>ÌÊÃÊÌÀÕiÊ
for probe-request and de-authentica-
tion kinds of flooding attacks.
However, sometimes rapid resource 
utilisation may be due to software bugs, 
viruses, and worms like MS-blast. The 
severity check module classifies such 
cases as non-flooding anomalies, in 
which the traffic flows are normal, yet 
there is rapid increase in the utilisation 
of resources.
The severity check module works 
by using simple rules of IF-ELSE. The 
generic form of rules is such as:
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Profile CPU Bandwidth Tru
Medium 31–50 26–40 28.5–45 
High 51–75 41–65 46–70
Severe Above 76 Above 66 Above 71
Table 2: Severity check using profiles.
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 -  H=
UÊ ÊÊÛ>ÕiÃÊ­
*1]ÊL>`Ü`Ì]Ê/ÀÕ®Ê
are below MEDIUM profile, THEN 
resource utilisation is NORMAL and 
the condition is good.
UÊ ÊÊÀÊ"-/ÊvÊÌiÃiÊÛ>ÕiÃÊ>ÛiÊ
MEDIUM OR HIGH values THEN 
resource utilisation is MEDIUM or 
HIGH and it is problem.
UÊ Ê  9Ê vÊ ÌiÃiÊ Û>ÕiÃÊ ÃÊ Ê ÌiÊ
SEVERE range THEN resource utili-
zation is SEVERE and it is a disaster.
Alarm module
The alarm module receives input from 
the severity check module, and raises 
separate types of alarms for flooding 
and non-flooding attacks to inform the 
appropriate controller.
5. Simulation results and 
discussion
To test the accuracy of our system, sev-
eral simulations have been conducted. 
The bandwidth of all links is 10Mbps. 
Normal nodes generate traffic at the rate 
of 0.3 Mbps. For conducting a flood-
ing attack Trible Flood Network 2000 
(TFN2K) is used, which is a clients/dae-
mons program that coordinates to launch 
a flooding attack (UDP, ICMP, SYN) 
against a victim machine. We analysed 
the traffic flows under different variations 
of flooding attacks. The use of resources 
was observed for severity. Total simulation 
duration was set to 200 seconds. In the 
first 100 seconds, normal traffic flow and 
resource utilisations were observed.
UDP flood
The UDP flood was started from 100–200 
seconds. As soon as the flood was started, 
some great variations were observed in 
traffic flow (packets/sec). The packets rate 
sharply increased once the flooding attack 
started, as shown in figure 3.
Under normal conditions (0–100 
seconds), UDP traffic is below 5 000 
packets/second. When a flooding attack 
is launched (100–200 seconds), the traffic 
flow sharply increases to 20000 packets/
second. At the peak of an UDP flood-
ing attack, the traffic flow is more than 
35 000 packets/second. The RCFDAT 
immediately detects the flooding attack 
and contacts the severity module to check 
the severity. The severity module checks 
the use of resources. During normal condi-
tions, both bandwidth and computations 
are below 30%. However, at the peak of a 
UDP flooding attack the Tru value reaches 
60, which indicates high severity.
SYN flood
In a normal environment, the TCP SYN 
and FIN rates are almost consistent. 
However, when a SYN flood is started 
from 100–200 seconds great variations 
are observed both in FIN and SYN rates 
as shown in figure 4.
Under normal conditions (0–100 sec-
onds), the SYN and FIN ratios are approx-
imately consistent. However, during a SYN 
flooding attack, the variation is quite huge 
and it is this variation that indicates a SYN 
flooding attack. Once RCFDAT detects a 
SYN flooding attack it consults the severity 
check module. The utilisation of resources 
can be seen in figure 5.
We can see that the bandwidth utili-
sation of SYN and UDP in the flood-
ing attack is approximately the same, 
however, the SYN flooding attack con-
sumes more computational resources. 
Here the Tru is approximately 65, 
which again indicates high severity.
Probe request and  
de-authentication flood
During a probe-request flooding 
attack, the probe-request flow suddenly 
increases. In normal circumstances, 
probe frames are in between 2–6 frames 
per second, however, during a flood-
ing attack arriving probe frames show 
a sharp increase to 20–30 frames per 
second. However, in a de-authentication 
attack arriving frames do not increase 
sharply per second, as this kind of attack 
is launched to de-authenticate the legiti-
mate users. If there are seven legitimate 
users currently using network resources, 
then in a de-authentication attack the 
adversary would send only seven de-
authentication frames. This is the reason 
we do not observe a sharp increase in 
arriving frames. The RCFDAT analy-
ses variations in the arriving frames, 
sequence number, MAC address, and the 
time interval to detect this kind of attack.
14
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UDP flood (UF) UF, M UF, H UF, S
SYN flood (SF) SF, M SF, H SF, S
ICMP flood (IF) IF, M IF, H IF, S
Probe request flood (PF) PF, M PF, H PF, S
De-authentication flood (DF) DF, M DF, H DF, S
Table 3: Classification analysis.
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De-authentication attacks are not 
so costly in terms of computation and 
bandwidth utilisation. However, probe-
request flooding attacks are medium in 
computational severity.
The overall detection rates of 
RCFDAT are given in table 4. The 
results show that RCFDAT has the 
capability to detect a variety of flooding 
attacks with maximum accuracy having 
low false alarms.
Keeping in mind the statistics given 
in table 4, it is clear that the RCFDAT 
has a satisfactory detection rate in 
terms of different multi-layered flood-
ing attacks.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, a cross-layered approach for 
detecting multi-layered flooding attacks is 
proposed. The theoretical fundamentals 
have been checked with the help of simula-
tions to test the accuracy of the proposed 
RCFDAT mechanism. To maximise the 
detection rate and minimise the false 
alarms ratio, RCFDAT observed traffic 
flow variations because the first sign of 
any flooding attack is a sharp increase in 
traffic flow. Once the flooding attack has 
been detected, the candidate mechanism 
observes the utilisation of the resources 
such as computational overheads and 
bandwidth consumption to check the 
severity and intensity of the flooding 
attack, measured as medium, high or 
severe. Conversely, if the traffic flow is nor-
mal and great variations are observed none-
theless in resource utilisations, then such 
an anomaly is classified as non-flooding. 
RCFDAT raises different sort of alarms to 
demonstrate the attack type.
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